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This article assesses the recent performance of the Turkish economy, questioning 
whether the currently observed unusual boom conditions will lead to a process of 
sustainable growth. The latest phase of Turkish neo-liberal transformation in the 
post-2001 era is placed in a broader historical and global context; at the same 
time, the performance of the economy in recent years is compared with that of 
other key emerging markets, based on selected macroeconomic indicators. 
Utilizing the East Asian experience as the principal benchmark for comparison, 
this paper examines whether Turkey is on its way to accomplishing tiger-like 
development performance. Given the current challenges to sustainable growth, we 
conclude that it is premature to suggest that the impressive performance of the 
recent years will lead to durable success and tiger-like performance. While the 
focus is on the Turkish experience, the paper also probes the very nature of tiger-
like performance itself, highlighting the fact that in setting standards for 
exceptional economic performance we need to extend our horizons beyond high 
rates of economic growth sustained over time, to broader indicators of social, 
political and human development.  
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Introduction 
The Turkish economy has experienced one of its most outstanding phases of growth in recent 
years. The period following the crisis of 2001 witnessed a successful transformation of the 
Turkish economy, due to a combination of structural reforms and measures aimed at 
establishing macroeconomic stability. In the post-2001 period, the Turkish economy managed 
to achieve high rates of growth. Furthermore, this growth was accomplished in an 
environment of fiscal discipline and single-digit inflation, which marked a dramatic departure 
from the endemic instability and chronic inflation that had become a norm over the last few 
decades. Another striking feature involved large inflows of foreign direct investment, again 
representing a major contrast to previous years. Privatization also gathered momentum, with 
large-scale privatization of state economic enterprises during the latest phase of Turkey’s on-
going neo-liberal structuring process. The wave of regulatory reforms encompassing, among 
others, the banking sector, the Central Bank, government expenditures and revenues, as well 
as foreign investment legislation constituted the very foundations of this impressive 
performance. It is fair to say that Turkey made significant progress in terms of establishing an 
effective regulatory state during this period. This paper examines the interaction of domestic 
and external influences that played a critical role in the recent transformation process. More 
significant, however, is the question whether the new institutional reforms towards 
establishing a regulatory state will be sufficient for generating outstanding performance on a 
durable basis. In other words, this paper questions whether or not the Turkish economy can 
emerge as a “new tiger.” 
  The basic premise of this paper is that exceptional economic performance rests on the 
following set of interrelated conditions: (a) High levels of investment form the central 
ingredient of economic growth. (b) The ability to attract foreign investment is important. 
However, a balanced structure necessitates high levels of domestic investment to complement   4
foreign investment. This, in turn, requires high levels of domestic savings. (c) The ability to 
sustain export orientation is essential. Export orientation is also critical for the ability to 
diversify exports in the direction of high-value added products with significant technology 
content. (d) The ability to devote resources to research and development as well as to 
education and human capital are key ingredients for success. The role of the state in 
development continues to be critical; an improvement of regulatory capacities of the state 
alone will not be sufficient for exceptional success. (e) Economic and political stability on a 
sustained basis forms a major underlying element of exceptional success. While the presence 
of an authoritarian regime is not a precondition for success, weak or unconsolidated 
democracies find it particularly hard to generate economic and political stability on a 
sustained basis, which, in turn, undermines their long-term growth potential. (f) Favorable 
regional dynamics, such as the EU enlargement process, embody a powerful transformative 
potential. External stimuli can help to generate a virtuous cycle of growth by creating a 
mutually reinforcing process of trade expansion, foreign investment flows and institutional 
improvement as part of the democratic consolidation process. 
  An assessment of the Turkish economy in the recent period necessitates a multi-
dimensional analysis within the context of both its own historical development and the global 
setting. Based on this multi-dimensional approach, the principal sections of this paper are 
organized along the following lines: The recent success in the Turkish economy will be 
evaluated based on its own historical standards, with particular reference to its early neo-
liberal experience and instability in the 1990s. Achievements in terms of inflation control, 
attraction of FDI and success on the privatization front will be all the more striking when 
compared to Turkey’s earlier experience in the economic realm (Section 2). Although the 
comparison of the two key periods in the history of the Turkish economy provides many 
insights into its continuities and ruptures, the assessment of the recent performance of the   5
Turkish economy in isolation is still inadequate, and a better understanding requires 
embedding the Turkish experience in a broader global and comparative context. Before 
comparing Turkey to key emerging markets, the East Asian (EA) development success and 
the concepts of “Asian tigers” and “tiger-like performance” will be analyzed in order to use 
the EA experience as a benchmark for the assessment of long-term sustainable growth in the 
Turkish case. Examining certain macroeconomic and social indicators of the EA success, this 
section indicates not only the measures responsible for providing sustainable growth, but also 
alternative theories specifying the reasons for the EA miracle (Section 3). Based on the 
insights gained from the EA experience, this section extends the limits and geographical 
scope of our inquiry, assessing the recent performance of the Turkish economy in a 
comparative perspective. Not only the EA economies, but also a number of key emerging 
markets from Latin America (LA) and Central Europe (CE) constitute an essential part of this 
analysis. The similarities with LA neo-liberal restructuring and the effects of the EU 
accession process in the CE context provide additional perspectives for the comparison 
(Section 4). Although the assessment of the recent performance of the Turkish economy 
supported by inter-temporal and cross-country comparisons highlights its impressive nature, 
this section argues that there exist certain weaknesses and observable threats to long-term 
growth. The large current account deficit, low savings rates, and overall dependence on 
foreign and favorable global liquidity are particularly striking in this context. Furthermore, the 
weakening of external anchors and rising political instability emerge as major challenges to 
the sustainability of the recent economic success. However, we also argue that these 
challenges can be balanced by medium- and long-term opportunities—such as regional 
cooperation, the geo-strategic importance of Turkey with respect to energy pipelines, and a 
demographic structure based on an unusually young working population (Section 5). Even 
though the first sections of the paper explicitly focus on conditions conducive or detrimental   6
to sustainable growth, in order to have a complete picture of “development” we go beyond the 
strict economic measures of growth and deal with the social dimensions of long-term 
development, incorporating into the analysis such factors as unemployment, inequality, 
poverty, and “human development” (Section 6). The last section summarizes the main 
arguments. 
 
The Turkish neo-liberal experiment: The 2001 crisis as a turning point 
The Turkish neo-liberal experience started in 1980 with the January 24 program, under the 
auspices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The program rapidly 
reached its initial targets in terms of reducing inflation, achieving higher growth rates, and 
taking steps towards trade and financial liberalization.
1 With the crisis of the late 1970s, 
import-substituting industrialization (ISI) policies appeared to have reached their limits; thus, 
the January 24 program was not only a stabilization program in a conventional sense, but also 
a starting point for the structural transformation of the Turkish economy along neo-liberal 
lines. As a result of ISI policies, Turkey managed to sustain high growth rates, introduce 
planned development, achieve rapid industrialization and outperform most LA cases in the 
period between 1963 and 1977; however, its growth failed to match the performance of EA 
economies. Indeed, excessive, indiscriminate and long-term protectionism associated with the 
ISI era in the Turkish economy was an important contributor to export stagnation and the 
endemic balance of payments crisis which had emerged by the late 1970s.
2 The first half of 
the 1980s under neo-liberal structuring appeared to reverse the previous trend and represented 
a certain progress towards establishing an externally competitive economy through a 
                                                 
1 For a detailed assessment of the period, see Ertuğrul & Selçuk (2001). According to the data provided by these 
scholars, the Turkish economy grew steadily by an average of 5.8% in the period between 1981 and 1988. See 
also Arıcanlı & Rodrik (1990) for a critical assessment of the Turkish neo-liberal experience. 
2 For an account of major policy phases and shifts in Turkish economic history, see Öniş & Şenses (2007) and 
Pamuk (2007). An important study which investigates the economic and political determinants of growth in 
Turkey from the nineteenth century to the present is Altuğ, Filiztekin and Pamuk (2007).    7
significant increase in exports. The ratio of total exports to GDP increased between 1980 and 
1988, from 4.1% to 13.3%.
3 Moreover, the process was accompanied by a diversification of 
exports, involving a striking increase in the share of manufactured exports at the expense of 
agricultural exports. However, the success on the export front could not be sustained in the 
second half of the 1980s.
4 This pattern appears to be a rather typical feature of Turkish 
economic development. There have been a number of such periods of unusual economic 
progress in the post-war era. However, these periods tended to be relatively short-lived and 
were followed by periods of stagnation and crisis. 
  The second phase of Turkish neo-liberalism in the 1990s was characterized by a high 
degree of macroeconomic and political instability, lower growth rates, chronic inflation and 
weak budgetary performance. The appreciation of the Turkish Lira (TL) was the major 
driving force behind the slowing pace of exports and rise of imports, leading to an external 
deficit. The ratio of external deficit to GDP increased to 2% in 1989, 4% in 1990, and 6% in 
1993. Towards the end of 1993, it was more or less obvious that the fiscal deficit and external 
balance situation became unsustainable.
5 Not surprisingly, given the size of the disequilibrium 
which had emerged, Turkey encountered its first crisis of the neo-liberal era in 1994—the TL 
was devalued twice, in January and April of 1994. Not only major shocks, but also chronic 
inflation turned out to be the essential characteristics of the neo-liberal era in the Turkish 
context. Due to the government’s low level of credibility and its lack of commitment to the 
stabilization program, as well as the high degree of currency substitution (dollarization) and 
the high costs of borrowing, chronic inflation could not be reduced during the 1990s. 
Similarly, due to the serious interest burden on government expenditures, PSBR / GNP ratios 
reached extremely high levels by international standards, rendering inflation control all the 
more difficult.  
                                                 
3 Ertuğrul & Selçuk (2001) 
4 For an explanation of the slow-down in export growth during the second half of the 1980s, see Öniş (1993). 
5 Ertuğrul & Selçuk (2001)   8
  In retrospect, the experience of the 1990s clearly illustrates the fact that the optimism 
surrounding the early phase of neo-liberal restructuring could not be sustained. Indeed, a 
number of analysts have pointed out the long-term institutional regularities which led to the 
reemergence of crisis-generating tendencies during the neo-liberal era. For example, in his 
analysis of Turkey-EU relations from an economic perspective, Mehmet Uğur, intending to 
explain why Turkey fell behind Central and East European countries (CEECs), even though 
Turkey’s liberalization efforts predated theirs, has argued that liberalization in Turkey was 
introduced within an institutional environment marked by excessive discretion and pervasive 
rent-seeking. As a result of intensive lobbying and rent-seeking activities by various interest 
groups, these discretionary acts involved a frequent use of governmental decrees and relied 
heavily on extra-budgetary funds.
6 Similarly, Mine Eder has argued that, in contrast to the 
rhetoric of neo-liberal economic policies, populism survived in the form of de-
institutionalization, patronage politics, and charismatic leadership.
7 In short, the neo-liberal 
era was clearly not different from the previous periods in respect to the institutional 
environment, leading to corruption and rent-seeking activities.  
  In addition, there were two major turning points in the second half of the 1980s, which 
are crucial for understanding the institutional features of instability in the 1990s. The first 
dramatic change affecting the institutional dynamics and the patterns of incentives for the 
actors in the Turkish economy was the revitalization of political competition in 1987, which 
enhanced the role of the populist element in Turkish politics. After the 1980 military 
intervention, Turkey was ruled by a military government for three years, and all political 
                                                 
6 See Uğur (2004). In order to indicate that Turkey falls behind CEECs, Uğur utilizes seven measures taken from 
the Transparency International and World Bank Governance Indicators. These measures are corruption 
perception, growth competitiveness, microeconomic competitiveness, quality of public institutions index, 
macroeconomic environment, company operations and microeconomic business environment. In almost all 
measures, Turkey falls behind the eight CEECs and is only able to outperform Bulgaria and Romania in some of 
these measures.  
7 See Eder (2004). For a detailed account of Özal’s economic legacy and the early period of Turkish neo-liberal 
era, see Öniş (2004).    9
parties and labor unions were banned.
8 Although general elections were held in 1983, the old 
political parties and leaders were not permitted to enter the competition. Without serious 
rivals, the Motherland Party (MP) emerged as the sole winner of the 1983 elections and 
established a majority government. The 1987 elections witnessed the re-emergence of 
political competition, with the entrance of the center-right True Path Party (TPP) as a follower 
of the Justice Party and the center-left Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) following in 
the footsteps of the Republican People’s Party. Although the MP managed to satisfy the 
government majority due to the uneven nature of the electoral system in the 1987 elections, it 
was finally defeated by the TPP and the SDPP in the 1991 general elections, and a post-
election coalition government was established. What appealed to the masses was the 
coalition’s promise to improve people’s living standards, which had been repressed by the 
wage rigidity of the post-coup authoritarian regime. Combined with the lack of budgetary 
discipline and loss of pace on the export front, this new populist element in the Turkish 
economy was responsible for creating institutional instability in the 1990s. The second key 
turning point is the capital account liberalization and the full convertibility of the TL in 1989. 
Arguably, this critical decision managed to postpone a possible financial crisis, but at the 
expense of a highly fragile pattern of debt-led economic growth.
9 Much more importantly, the 
decision of capital account liberalization was made without establishing the necessary 
institutional environment to supervise and regulate the high liquidity of international flows.
10 
                                                 
8 Although beyond the scope of this paper, another interesting debate on the role of the military intervention in 
the neo-liberal era is whether military interludes have created a stable environment for reforms. One should be 
mindful of the fact that the authoritarian nature of the military rule allowed an implementation of repressive 
policies, reducing real wages and eliminating political opposition by shutting down former political parties, labor 
unions and other civil society elements, in a sense blocking the mechanisms of interest intermediation in the 
political process. In addition, it undermined the trust of key social actors and prevented the institutionalization of 
the party system, leading to discontinuity and fragmentation. For a detailed discussion of the argument, see Öniş 
(1997). It should also be taken into account that the military intervention and the interruption of the democratic 
process caused the deterioration of Turkey-EU relations throughout the 1980s and 1990s, preventing the EU 
from playing its role as an anchor not only in terms of democratization, but also economic development.  
9 See Öniş (2003) for a detailed discussion on the return of the populist element to Turkish politics and pre-
mature capital account liberalization leading to debt-led growth.  
10 For pre-mature capital account liberalization, see Arıcanlı &Rodrik (1990).    10
Speculative attacks in an environment of large budget deficits proved to be the key proximate 
causes for the successive crises of 1994, 2000, and 2001.  
  The post-2001 period represents a clear rupture from the unstable macroeconomic 
environment of the 1990s in terms of higher growth rates, lower inflation, fiscal discipline, 
attracting FDI, and success on the privatization front. The recent success of the Turkish 
economy in comparison to earlier periods can, first of all, be observed through growth 
performance data. Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that the post-2001 period outperforms the 
unstable 1990s with regard to the GDP growth. The average growth rate between 1991 and 
1995 and between 1996 and 2000 appeared as 4.1% and 3.9% per annum, respectively. It 
should also be noted that in the 1990s growth was not steady and sustainable, as it was 
challenged by the immense recessions of 1994 and 1999, resulting in a negative growth of 
6%. Especially the 2001 financial crisis and the following 9.5% recession is a clear indicator 
that the Turkish economy is vulnerable to financial shocks in the form of rapid outflows of 
speculative short-term portfolio investments, external shocks (such as the effects of the 
Russian crisis of 1998 on trade links in Turkey), and the overall dependence on foreign 
capital. Although similar vulnerabilities continue to exist at present, it is clear that the recent 
growth performance between 2002 and 2006 has outperformed the previous periods by a 
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Figure 1. Growth rate in Turkey 























An equally striking improvement can be observed for the inflation rate. While the early 
experience of the Turkish economy with the neo-liberal adjustment was characterized by 
chronic inflation, the post-2001 period has witnessed a serious decline in the inflation rate. 
The average inflation in the 1980s was 52% per annum; between 1991 and 1995, 78.8 % per 
annum, and between 1996 and 2000, 74.1 % per annum (Table 1). In contrast, the average 
inflation rate between 2002 and 2006 declined to 19.4% per annum. Much more importantly, 
the inflation rate was kept below the 10% threshold per annum for the consecutive years of 
2004, 2005 and 2006. In contrast to the unstable macroeconomic environment of the 1990s, 
the achievement on the inflation front—that is, price stability—seems to be the major 
contributory factor to the macroeconomic stability and investor confidence.  
  The third major indicator of macroeconomic stability in the post-2001 period is fiscal 
discipline. A major aim of the 1980 program had involved the achievement of fiscal   12
discipline. In spite of an initial improvement, however, the program clearly failed to establish 
fiscal discipline over time. Table 1 highlights the fact that, following a modest success in the 
reduction of the PSBR ratio in the first half of the 1980s, there is a secular trend involving an 
increase of the PSBR ratio throughout the 1990s, reaching its peak during the 2001 crisis with 
more than 16% of the GNP. In the post-2001 era, in contrast, the PSBR / GNP ratio has 
declined by a tremendous margin, in line with the Maastricht criteria.
11 Hence, the 
government’s commitment to fiscal discipline in the post-crisis era constitutes another 
element of macroeconomic stability.  
 










2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2002-
2006 
Inflation  51,7  78,8  74,1  54,2  45,1  25,3  8,6  8,2  9,6  19,4 
PSBR/GNP  5,0 8,8 9,3  16,4  12,7  9,4 4,7 -0,4  -2,6  4,8 
FDI inflows  n.a  756,
6 
846,4  3352  1.13
7 
1752  2847  9673  19919  5646,6 
Privatization 
Revenues 
n.a 432 907  120 537 187 1283  8222  8096 3665 
 
Source: Inflation data are taken from IMF World Economic Outlook; PSBR/GNP data from 
the State Planning Organization; FDI data from the Secretariat of Treasury; and data on 
privatization revenues from the Privatization Administration of Turkey.  
                                                 
11 According to the Maastricht criteria, the PSBR / GNP ratio should be lower than 3%.    13
Key: The data for the periods are simple averages of yearly data. The data on inflation and 
PSBR / GNP are in percentages, whereas the data on FDI and privatization revenues are in 
millions of US$. 
 
In the post-2001 era, Turkey has also managed to attract significant levels of FDI, which 
represents a striking contrast with both the ISI era and the earlier phases of neo-liberal 
restructuring. In retrospect, it was not only the macroeconomic stability and rising investor 
confidence, but also the concrete prospect of EU membership that brought about a significant 
increase in the amount of FDI.
12 As can be observed from Table 1, following the EU 
Council’s decision to initiate accession negotiations in December of 2004 and its confirmation 
in October of 2005, the amount of FDI inflows to Turkey has reached the level of 20 billion 
US$ per annum, higher than the total recorded for the period between 1980 and 2000 as a 
whole. 
  Parallel to the recent success on the FDI front, privatization revenues have 
significantly increased in the post-2001 era. In fact, privatization was a strong component of 
the post-1980 neo-liberal adjustment in Turkey, in the sense that privatization was perceived 
as a strong contributor to the economic performance, increasing efficiency, reducing the 
burden of the state stemming from SEEs, contributing to capital market development, and 
broadening property ownership.
13. However, lack of the executive authority’s strength and 
coherence, the depth of political and economic crises, and an unfavorable external 
environment were the reasons for the failure of early privatization attempts.
14 In this respect, 
the post-2001 period was crucial for privatization in terms of both confidence and 
macroeconomic stability due to favorable global liquidity conditions. The revenues gained in 
                                                 
12 For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s FDI challenges with specific reference to the EU accession process, legal 
requirements and the formation of a competitive framework, see Dutz et al. (2004). 
13 Ibid. 
14 See Ercan & Öniş (2001).    14
2005 and 2006 almost reached the 10 billion US$ threshold, an amount equivalent to the size 
of the budget deficit.
15 
  So far, our analysis of the Turkish economy has focused on indicators of recent 
success in terms of generating macroeconomic stability and an environment conducive to 
sustainable growth. Yet, a detailed account of the Turkish neo-liberal experience should also 
highlight transformations in the institutional structure of the economy, which have effectively 
contributed to the striking improvement in broad macroeconomic indicators. Three elements 
of institutional reform deserve particular emphasis. First of all, the commitment to fiscal 
discipline was clearly enhanced through transparency and accountability measures, as well as 
improvements in the tax administration. Secondly, the banking sector reform and the 
strengthening of the position of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) 
helped to overcome the weaknesses of the Turkish banking system—one of the central 
elements of instability in the 1990s that had led to successive financial crises in 1994, 2000, 
and 2001.
16 Since 2001, the banking and financial system has been tightly regulated in line 
with international norms and assumed a more robust structure against possible financial 
crises. Thirdly, measures taken to enhance the autonomy of the Central Bank (CB) were 
critical to the success on the inflation front, by limiting the scope for “populist” government 
interventions.
17 
  Clearly, a legitimate question needs to be raised at this juncture: if such institutional 
reforms were so crucial, why were they not implemented earlier? The following framework—
which takes into account the role of external actors, crises and domestic policy coalitions, as 
                                                 
15 It is not yet clear whether the recent large-scale privatization has increased efficiency. There are doubts 
whether the privatization of state monopolies, such as the Turkish Telecom Company, changes the monopolistic 
nature of the market and creates efficient competition. A case in point is the Argentine Telecom: while its 
privatization led to the compensation of the budget deficit and attracted FDI, no significant improvements in 
efficiency and quality were observed. For an overview of the Argentine Telecom experience, see Luigi Manzetti 
(2000). 
16 For an evaluation of the Turkish banking system in the 1990s with an emphasis on the lack of regulation and 
the role of the IMF in the reform process, see Alper & Öniş (2004). For a much more recent assessment of 
banking system reforms including their nature and limitations, see Bakır & Öniş (2008). 
17 For a detailed account of the reform process involving the Turkish Central Bank, see Bakır (2007).    15
well as their mutual interaction—may offer an explanation for this puzzle.
18 The dominant 
external actors were the EU and the IMF. The involvement of the IMF can be explained in 
reference to US geo-strategic interests. What is new and much more important in the recent 
Turkish context is the emergence of the EU as an external anchor in the post-Helsinki era. 
With the concrete prospect of EU membership, the incentives and conditionality provided by 
the EU turned out to be the most important determinant of political and economic change in 
Turkey. On a domestic level, the new policy regime was strongly supported by the key 
segments of big business as well as small and medium-sized interests.
19 The domestic actors 
believed in the necessity of a properly regulated macroeconomic environment in order to 
achieve stability and sustainable growth. However, this account does not explain why external 
and domestic actors changed their policy preferences. At this point, the role of crises should 
be embedded into the analysis, with respect to their effects on the incentives and interests of 
certain key actors in economic management. Namely, the East Asian Crisis of 1997 
challenged the role of the IMF in many respects and led the IMF to support a certain level of 
state regulatory capacity. This shift in the policy paradigm can be observed in the IMF’s 
insistence on the establishment of the BRSA in Turkey. Similarly, it can be argued that the 
2001 crisis changed the incentives of key actors in the Turkish economy, pushing them 
toward accepting the necessity for reform and structural transformation. However, one last 
question remains: why was it the 2001 crisis, and not the 1994 or 2000 crises, that led to a 
significant change in the incentives and interests of key domestic actors? The simple answer 
to the puzzle lies in the very depth and intensity of the 2001 crisis. It was undoubtedly far 
more detrimental in its effects and, unlike the previous crises, not only affected middle and 
lower classes, but also directly challenged the interests of dominant groups in the financial 
and real sectors of the economy.  
                                                 
18This framework has been developed in Öniş and Şenses (2007) and used as a basis for understanding major 
policy reversals in post-war Turkish economic history.  
19 Ibid. p 21.   16
  Having analyzed the internal dynamics and differences of the Turkish neo-liberal 
experiment over time, this analysis has so far examined the positive developments in the 
Turkish economy. However, for a better assessment of this recent performance, it is necessary 
to compare the Turkish case with other countries’ experiences. Thus, the following section 
will discuss the bases of the EA success, a striking element of which is a high rate of 
economic growth sustained over long time intervals. 
 
The East Asian development experience and the characteristics of tiger-like 
performance 
The EA economies were the clear winners of the post-war development, given that they 
achieved steady and high growth rates in an environment of low inflation, low inequality, and 
political stability. Numerous scholars have devoted their work to understanding the 
extraordinary growth performance of EA economies. These economies have been called 
“Asian tigers,”
20 based on their outstanding growth rates sustained over the long run. The 
concept of “tigerhood” or “tiger-like performance,” then, turned out to be a trademark for 
those countries who achieved extraordinary success in long-run growth performance. That is 
why, in order to assess the recent performance of the Turkish economy in a global setting, the 
first step should be to clearly identify what we mean by the concept through analyzing the 
experience of EA countries.  
  What makes these EA economies distinctive? What are the economic measures and 
indicators that make them divergent from the rest of the world? Obviously, the foremost 
indicator is their growth performance. Eight of twelve hyper-performers or outliers are from 
                                                 
20 In the literature, EA economies are categorized under four groups with respect to the date of their take-off 
phase. Japan by itself constitutes the first subset, emerging as the outperformer in the post-WWII context until 
the 1980s. Japan is followed by the “Gang of Four,” namely South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, 
which started to grow in the 1960s and 1970s. The third group is composed of Thailand, Malaysia and, to some 
extent, Indonesia. This group started to grow in the 1980s, but could not achieve growth levels similar to those of 
the first two groups. The last group is composed of China only; although a latecomer due to its socialist regime, 
it has been the fastest-growing economy in the world for the past twenty years. For these terms and 
categorization, see Haggard (1995) and Rowen (1998).    17
East Asia.
21 Japan and the “Gang of Four” managed to sustain growth rates of around 5.5% 
per capita (PPP), whereas Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia achieved 3.5% between 1965 
and 1990.
22 The second characteristic of the EA development is their achievement of 
sustainable growth in a relatively low inflation environment. With the exception of Indonesia 
in the 1960s and South Korea between 1960 and 1980, all EA economies experienced 
inflation rates of less than 10% per annum.
23 Thirdly, EA economies are characterized by 
high domestic savings and investment. The data on the savings and investment level for 1995 
indicate that all EA countries have 30-40% domestic savings, coupled with generally 2-3 % 
percent higher investments.
24 This not only allows them to invest and grow at high rates, but 
also makes them less vulnerable to global liquidity conditions and foreign capital dependence. 
We will discuss the issue of a low level of domestic savings and externally dependent growth 
in the Turkish case as a major challenge to sustainability of growth below.  
  The fourth distinctive characteristic of EA economies to be taken into account is their 
export competitiveness in comparison to other developing countries. These economies 
managed to increase their exports significantly between 1960 and 1990. They diversified their 
exports and achieved a shift from low-technology to high-technology products (Figure 2). A 
comparison of Turkey with Malaysia, South Korea and newly rising China clearly indicates 
the differences in terms of export competitiveness. While Malaysia, South Korea and China 
are able to devote 55, 32 and 31%, respectively, of their total exports to high-tech products, 
only 2 % of total Turkish exports are products with high technology content.   
 
 
                                                 
21 Petri (1993), according to his calculation, has argued that it is a possibility of 1/1.000.000 that eight of twelve 
outstanding performers come from the same region. This is a clear expression of why we should pay particular 
attention to East Asia and regional dynamics. The other four successful countries are Botswana, Malta, Mauritius 
and Cyprus.  
22 Rowen (1998), p. 2 
23 For the exact figures, see Table 1.2 in Sönmez (2003), p.39. 
24 Ibid., p. 40.    18
Figure 2. Ratio of high technology exports to total exports 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Report 2007 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of income in EA and Turkey 
 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2007 
 
Yet another dimension of EA development is its relatively egalitarian pattern of income 
distribution.
25 This observation needs to be qualified, however, given that Figure 3 portrays a 
mixed picture. While Japan and South Korea, as more egalitarian societies, have relatively 
low Gini coefficients, other countries are similar to Turkey in terms of income inequality, 
                                                 
25 For historical figures on income inequality, see Sönmez (2003), p. 326.    19
with coefficients higher than 0.35. Although the equality aspect of EA development is widely 
discussed in the literature, the recent data on the Gini coefficient supports the validity of the 
argument only for the Japanese and South Korean case, but cannot be extended to other cases.  
  The sixth and last aspect of EA development is its superiority in terms of broader 
indicators of development, rather than simply narrow measures of growth. Figure 4 
demonstrates the ranks of EA countries and Turkey with respect to the Human Development 
Index.
26 The countries are ordered in line with their take-off phase, and the HDI ranking is 
quite representative of this four-subset model.
27 One can also look at government spending on 
education and the corruption index in order to gain a better understanding of the 
improvements in both human capital and business environment in EA economies. However, 
for the sake of clarity, these figures are omitted from our analysis.  
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26 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a measure provided by the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). The measure consists of three elements: life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, and GDP per capita 
(PPP).  
27 See footnote 20 for the four subsets of EA development. The HDI ranking is in line with this fourfold logic, 
with the only exception of China, which outperforms Indonesia with its recent development.  
28 The data on Taiwan are not provided by the UN and UNDP since the diplomatic status of Taiwan is disputed.    20
Having examined the distinctive features of EA development, it is necessary to explain the 
nature of this distinctiveness in order to shed light on the dynamics of sustainable growth. Our 
treatment here will, of necessity, be very selective, as our objective is to single out the crucial 
elements of EA success, which will then be used as a basis for comparison with the recent 
Turkish experience. 
 The  neo-classical perspective emerged with the critique of ISI, on the grounds that 
short-run efficient resource allocation leads to long-term growth. Therefore, “getting the 
prices right” through market mechanism and minimum state intervention is an essential part 
of the neo-classical perspective.
29 From the 1970s onwards, economists have used this 
paradigm to examine the outstanding success of EA.
30 What makes EA economies distinctive 
to them is their effort to create an outward-oriented and export-competitive economy in 
contrast to inefficient domestic-oriented ISI strategies. Balassa has associated this export 
orientation with limited government intervention, stability of incentives, well-functioning 
labor and capital markets, as well as reliance on private capital.
31 High domestic savings, 
capital formation (both physical and human), stable exchange rates, and the ability to attract 
FDI were also considered as the main impetus for sustainable growth.
32 However, this 
perspective has been heavily criticized for being ahistorical, in the sense that it cannot 
satisfactorily explain the reasons for capital formation, technological improvement, and 
investment in human capital. Furthermore, this perspective has been criticized for 
underestimating the role of state intervention and political dimension.
33  
 The  statist perspective stems from the latter criticism, namely the neglect of the role of 
the state. In contrast to the neo-classical perspective, statists argue that the state has a strategic 
                                                 
29 See So & Chiu (1995), p.4.  
30 For earlier studies from this perspective, see Balassa (1981), Balassa et al. (1982), Hughes (1980), Little 
(1982), and Patrick & Rosovsky (1982).  
31 See Balassa (1988), and So & Chiu (1995). 
32 Stubbs (2005), p.4.  
33 Ibid., p.4; Haggard (1990).    21
role in taming market failures and provides better allocation of resources in the long run.
34 
This argument is based on the “infant industry principle” going back to Friedrich List.
35 
Statists emphasize the “developmental” role of state because of its ability to make 
development its foremost objective and maximize economic growth by mediating market 
forces through various pilot agencies—for example, the Ministry of Trade and Investment 
(MITI) in Japan.
36 In order to answer the neo-classical critiques of ISI and state intervention 
in economics, statist scholars clearly emphasize the duality of subsidies and discipline. 
Furthermore, bureaucratic autonomy and public-private cooperation is examined in the EA 
context in order to indicate the complementary nature of state and markets.
37 Linda Weiss and 
John Hobson have presented a much more nuanced version of the statist perspective that does 
not reject markets, but works with them in tandem; they have argued that “its emphasis is on 
the  synergy  of competitive collaboration between guided markets, in the pursuit of 
developmental objectives. In sum, bringing the state back in does not entail kicking the 
society out.”
38 In a sense, it is not a matter of whether the state should intervene or not; what 
is important is to find the appropriate balance between state and market. The statist 
perspective has been criticized for not achieving a consensus on what kind of intervention 
should be prescribed for developmental states.
39 Nevertheless, the statist perspective has 
significantly challenged the dominancy of the neo-classical paradigm in explaining EA 
development. Studies within the statist perspective have provided much more detailed 
accounts and empirical analyses of the development trajectories of particular EA states.
40 
                                                 
34 So & Chiu (1995), p.12. 
35 For a renewed version of the infant industry argument within a historical and developmental perspective, see 
Ha-Joon (2002).  
36 The “developmental state” concept is used by Johnson (1982).  
37 See Amsden (1989) and Öniş (1991).  
38 Weiss & Hobson (1995), p. 138. For the argument about “bringing the state back in,” see Evans et al. (1985).  
39 Stubbs (2005). 
40 For the leading studies, see Johnson (1982) on Japan, Amsden (1989) on South Korea, and Wade (1990) on 
Taiwan. For a review article, see Öniş (1991).     22
 The  culturalist perspective identifies the nature of EA development within a context of 
values, attitudes, practices and institutions that underpin particular policy choices for 
developmental strategy.
41 Culturalist scholars link certain traits of the more than two-
thousand-year-old Confucian culture with the developmental aspects of EA countries. 
Confucian culture is thought to be conducive to the EA type of capitalist development.
42 From 
this perspective, Confucian culture is associated with obedience to legitimate authority, 
familialism, and respect for education, duty, hard work, and discipline.
43 It is argued that the 
reasons for the authoritarian nature of the government, family-oriented business structure, and 
policy choices concerning education and investment in human capital are the direct outcome 
of Confucian cultural traits. However, this perspective fails to explain why these Confucian 
societies failed to maintain comparable steady growth rates and development in the early part 
of the twentieth century, in marked contrast to their achievements in its second half. 
  Japan-centered explanations emphasize two central points: On the one hand, the 
former Japanese colonial experience in the region, although repressive, established the 
institutional features for long-term growth.
44 On the other hand, in the post-war era Japan 
played the leading role in the regional development through financial aid, being a role model 
for others, and, most importantly, through the transfer of industrial capacity to other 
economies, in line with its technological advancement and increasing cost of labor.
45 This 
perspective provides many insights into regional development and the role of external actors 
in the achievement of sustainable growth. 
  American hegemony explanations are based on dependency theory, arguing that the 
US and its strategic interests in the region during its fight with communism constituted a 
                                                 
41 See So & Chiu (1995), p.8. 
42 On Confucian culture and its effects on development, see Rozman (1992), Pye (1985), and Hofheinz & Calder 
(1982).  
43 Hicks & Redding (1983), and Stubbs (2005).  
44 See Stubbs (2005), and Kohli (1994). 
45 The “flying geese model” with Japan playing the leading role can be considered in this context. See the 
seminal article by Akamatsu (1962).   23
major force for providing financial aid to these newly industrializing countries. EA economies 
were encouraged to adopt some type of capitalism which the US imported to the region.
46 
However, this approach has been criticized on the grounds that it cannot explain cases other 
than those of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Yet, from a political economy perspective it is 
crucial for shedding light on the role of external influences and strategic interests in shaping 
economic policies.  
  The explanation of tiger-style economic performance requires a historical perspective 
that takes into account the complex interplay of external and domestic institutional and 
political forces. Since our aim is to use the EA experience as a basis for a comparison with the 
recent Turkish economic performance, we would like to highlight the following interrelated 
dimensions of the EA experience regarding conditions for sustainable growth: (a) high 
domestic savings and investment provide the resources for physical and human capital 
formation without the risk of running a serious balance of payment deficit; (b) in line with the 
latter, a lower degree of dependence on foreign capital and global liquidity conditions; (c) 
outward-oriented, export-competitive and technologically developed industrialization; (d) 
selectivity, discipline and dialogue in industrial policy, in contrast to perverse incentives and 
heavy and indiscriminate protectionism associated with typical ISI experiences; (e) the 
importance of a highly dynamic regional environment for attracting FDI; (f) single-minded 
focus on human capital development, i.e. education and health; and (g) relative stability of the 
underlying institutional and political environment or governance structure. 
  Although the insights gained from the EA experience provide fertile ground for a 
comparative analysis, our assessment of the recent Turkish economic success in a global 
setting incorporates also certain key emerging markets from Latin America, Central Europe, 
India and Russia. Our reasons for this are as follows: firstly, a broader comparison of the 
                                                 
46 See Arrighi (1996) and So & Chiu (1995).    24
Turkish economy provides alternative venues for a theoretical debate; secondly, and much 
more specifically, there are strong similarities between the emerging markets in Latin 
America and Turkey in terms of their early experience with neo-liberal structuring; and, 
thirdly, the incorporation of CE emerging markets provides extra leverage with respect to the 
EU accession process, FDI attraction and democratization. Moreover, even though the EA 
model seems to be an outstanding example of sustainable growth, it might not be the best 
model for Turkey, given the illiberal nature of EA countries’ governing structures and weak 
democratic credentials. Last but not least, tiger-like performance is not unique to EA 
countries. To the best of our knowledge, the term has recently been applied to the cases of 
Ireland and the Baltic states.
47 In this respect, the extended boundaries of our comparative 
analysis should provide a better outlook for the sustainability of Turkey’s economic growth. 
In other words, we ask whether Turkey will emerge as a new tiger, but not necessarily an East 
Asian-style new tiger. 
 
The recent performance of the Turkish economy in a global setting 
Embedding the Turkish experience in a comparative analysis enables us to better grasp the 
global trends affecting key emerging markets, as well as to better identify the achievements 
and limits of the recent reform process and structural transformation of the Turkish economy. 
The comparative data on growth between 2000 and 2006 indicate that Turkey achieved a 
successful growth rate higher than the regional averages and most of the emerging markets, 
with the exception of China, India and Russia with the growth rates of 9.8, 7.4 and 6.4% per 
annum, respectively. The fact that the GDP in Turkey fell by 9.5% in 2001 due to a major 
financial crisis makes the Turkish success in terms of growth performance even more striking. 
Thus, the growth performance data covering the period between 2002 and 2006 indicate a 
                                                 
47 For an analysis of Irish success and the term “Celtic tiger,” see O’Hearn (2000).    25
7.5% average growth per annum for Turkey. This comparative data also indicates that EA 
countries continue to be the outstanding performers of growth, exceeding LA and CE. 
 
Figure 5. GDP growth in a global setting 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Report 2007 
 





























Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 
                                                 
48 The regional growth rate was calculated as the weighted average of the countries located in particular regions. 
49 Regional inflation was calculated as the simple average of the countries in particular regions.    26
As we have argued above, Turkey has also achieved significant success on the inflation front. 
However, a cross-country comparison indicates a less impressive picture. In relative terms, 
Turkey appears to be the worst performer among the key emerging markets, followed by 
Russia, Argentina and Indonesia (Figure 6). Even the recent trend of the 10% inflation 
threshold is well above the emerging market averages. In a global environment characterized 
by low inflation rates, Turkish policy-makers should not feel over-confident about their 
achievements concerning inflation. 
  Comparative data on current account balance (CAB) highlights another weakness of 
the recent Turkish economic performance. While EA countries and Russia register current 
account surpluses and LA countries maintain balanced current account positions, Turkey and 
CE countries tend to display serious current account deficits.  
 
Figure 7. Current account balance as a ratio of GDP in key regions
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50 The regional CAB / GDP ratio was calculated as the weighted average of the countries in particular regions.   27
Arguably, EA countries followed a much more cautious current account balance 
policy after the East Asian Crisis in 1997. Similarly, LA countries such as Argentina are 
careful not to become dependent on foreign capital and short-term portfolio investment, 
having experienced a major economic crisis in 2001. However, Turkey seems to be unaffected 
by its earlier experience of current account deficit and dependence on short-term portfolio 
investment. The current account deficit and the dependence on foreign lending seem to be 
some of the major challenges to sustainable growth in Turkey, especially as favorable global 
liquidity conditions are in the process of serious reversion.  
  The fourth lesson to be drawn from the EA experience and the international 
comparison of key emerging markets is the importance of an externally-competitive and 
export-oriented economy. EA economies both diversified their exports and enhanced the level 
of technology required for their export products. In other words, they succeeded in 
transforming their economies from low-value added products to technology-intensive high-
value added products. Figure 8 indicates the research and development (R&D) expenditures 
as a share of the GDP. Countries like Korea, the Czech Republic, China, and Russia spend 
more on R&D activities, which in turn enhances their long-run growth and technology-
intensive export competitiveness. Turkey’s performance is more modest in this respect, more 
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Source: UNESCO, 2004-2005 
 
Similarly, there are clear differences between the key emerging markets with respect 
to their export products. Figure 9 indicates that the exports of countries such as Malaysia, 
Korea, China, Hungary and Mexico are largely comprised of high-tech products. In contrast, 
Turkey has a low figure in this regard. It should also be noted that there is no direct short-term 
correspondence between R&D investment and high technology exports, due to the long-term 
effects of these investment, the disadvantage of being a late-comer, and other factors such as 
FDI. An analysis of the key regions enables us to see that EA countries and, to some extent, 
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Figure 9. Share of high technology exports in total exports 























Source: World Bank, World Development Report 2007 
 




























Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2007 
 
Last but not least, beyond the strict limits of economic growth, one should also take into 
account the broader aims of development. The Human Development Index (HDI) is the 
appropriate measure to use in this context. According to HDI data, while Turkey boasts great 
success in GDP growth, such success cannot be demonstrated in terms of human   30
development. All LA and CE countries perform significantly better than Turkey. Only India 
and Indonesia perform worse than Turkey (Figure 10). Even China as the newly emerging 
tiger seems to be ahead of Turkey in this respect. The status of Turkey in terms of HDI should 
be enhanced, not only by focusing on the growth side, but also by investing in human 
capital—namely, education and health. Sustainable growth in the longer term can only be 
achieved via an improvement of human capital. 
  Moving beyond the interpretation of basic data for international comparisons, three 
crucial points deserve further emphasis. First of all, the EA and LA economies, and much 
more explicitly Russia, have been very sensitive to their current account balance after having 
experienced serious financial crises due to the speculative outflow of short-term portfolio 
investment. Turkey and CE economies, however, appear to follow a different path. 
Nevertheless, in a changed environment where global liquidity conditions are less favorable, 
these economies will find themselves much more vulnerable to external shocks. 
  Secondly, further comparative analysis between Turkey and CE countries is required 
in regard to the EU accession process and the amount of FDI attracted. Although Turkey 
started its neo-liberal adjustment in the post-1980 period, having transformed itself from a 
socialist rule to a liberal market economy, a decade later it was not Turkey, but CE countries 
that managed to attract a significant level of FDI and to become EU members. The relative 
failure of Turkey in terms of attracting FDI and becoming an EU member is quite paradoxical 
in comparison to those three CE countries—namely, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland. Turkey only recently managed to attract significant levels of FDI, following the EU 
Council’s decision to initiate accession negotiations in December of 2004 and the 
confirmation of this decision in October of 2005. This also indicates the role of the EU as an 
external anchor, as well as the vicious and virtuous cyclical nature of Turkey-EU relations. In 
the unstable macroeconomic environment of the 1990s, Turkey failed to receive the EU’s   31
strong signals in the direction of full membership, which, in turn, constituted a significant 
obstacle in terms of preventing Turkey from sustaining macroeconomic stability, promoting 
investor confidence and, hence, attracting FDI on a significant scale. In contrast, the post-
2001 experience corresponds to a virtuous cycle. As Turkey made important strides towards 
satisfying the economic and political components of the Copenhagen criteria, the macro-
environment became progressively more conducive to attracting FDI on a large scale and the 
parallel process of implementing an ambitious privatization program.
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Thirdly, deducing lessons from the CE experience and the EU accession process is 
crucial for the democratization of Turkey. The EA experience constitutes a benchmark for 
sustainable development. However, with their repressive and authoritarian regimes EA 
                                                 
51 For a detailed assessment of the EU’s role in shaping the political economy of Turkey, see Öniş and Bakır 
(2007).   32
countries fail to satisfy Western democratic credentials. Even the democratic regimes of the 
region appear to be “illiberal democracies” by the standards of European or Western 
democracies. What Turkey seeks in the long run should not only be sustainable growth, but 
also better democratic credentials in terms of governance, rule of law, political rights, and 
civil liberties. In this respect, the role of the EU as an external anchor and learning from the 
experience of CE countries are all the more important.  
 
Sustainable growth: Challenges and opportunities 
Although our analysis of the performance of the Turkish economy in the recent period 
indicates that Turkey has achieved an outstanding success in comparison to its earlier 
experience in the neo-liberal era and modest success in comparison to the key emerging 
markets, a detailed and balanced account of the Turkish economy should also identify the 
challenges and possible opportunities for sustainable growth. Turkey will achieve sustainable 
growth and deliver a “tiger-like” performance only to the extent to which it will be able to 
overcome its challenges and capitalize on its opportunities.  
  A. Current Account Deficit: The foremost challenge to the sustainability of growth and 
macroeconomic stability in the Turkish economy is the high level of the current account 
deficit (CAD). Figure 12 clearly indicates that the current account deficit has increased 
tremendously in the post-2001 era, not only in terms of the amount, but also as a percentage 
of the GDP. The early experience of the Turkish economy has proved that the current account 
deficit might turn into a balance of payment crisis in an open economy, where capital account 
is liberalized and full convertibility is guaranteed.  
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Figure 12. Current account balance as a percentage of GDP 
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Figure 13, on the other hand, enables us to recognize the components of the CAD in the 
Turkish economy and the factors leading to the CAD. The large bulk of the CAD stems from 
the deficit in commodities trade—that is, the difference between exports and imports. Turkish 
exports have experienced considerable diversification in the post-1980 period, from primary 
to manufactured goods, with textiles, iron, steel and manufactured foodstuff representing the 
major growth industries in the early years of neo-liberal reforms. More recently, during the 
post-2001 era, manufacture of motor vehicles has emerged as a major export industry. Yet, 
these transformations have failed to keep in check the increase of the trade deficit during the 
same period. A number of factors explain the phenomenon. First, export growth and 
diversification could not be accomplished in a sustained manner. Secondly, Turkish exports 
display a high degree of import dependence. Thirdly, the Customs Union has created a certain 
bias in favor of imports. Last but not least, the appreciation of the TL undermines the   34
international competitiveness of Turkish goods.
52 The second component of the deficit is due 
to the imbalance between domestic savings and investment. Turkey’s domestic savings have 
been traditionally lower than the gross fixed capital investments, which need to be 
compensated by foreign capital, in the form of short-term portfolio investment, credit channel, 
or FDI (Figure 14).
53 The lower level of domestic savings does not only create the CAD, but 
also hampers investment in the long run. The EA economies, in contrast, have managed to 
sustain domestic savings of 35-40%, which rendered their investment and growth at least 
partially immune to external shocks and global liquidity crises.  
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52 For the details of the argument and recent assessment of the CAD in Turkey, see Eşiyok (2008).  
53 Based on the CB data, Eşiyok (2008) has indicated that 50% of the recent CAD is compensated through FDI.    35
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B: Externally dependent growth: The CAD and low domestic savings make the 
Turkish economy dependent on foreign capital and global liquidity conditions. The sub-prime 
mortgage crisis and the possible recession in the US economy may affect the Turkish 
economy in a number of ways: due to the change in favorable global liquidity conditions, it 
will be much harder for Turkey to attract foreign capital through credit, portfolio investment 
and FDI channels. Equally importantly, Turkey will indirectly be affected through the trade 
linkages with the EU; with the US recession having a direct impact on the EU, Turkey will 
feel the repercussions.  
  C: Slowing pace of FDI and privatization: Although the most recent data are not 
available as of yet, many Turkish economists warn that the recent boom of FDI and 
privatization is over. This is partly due to the nature of the FDI that has entered Turkey in 
recent years. The FDI did not come to Turkey in the Greenfield investment form, but mostly   36
in the form of mergers/acquisitions and privatization. Once the opportunities for large-scale 
privatization have been exhausted, it might prove more difficult to attract FDI.  
D: Decreasing influence of external anchors: One of the reasons for the recent 
improvement in Turkey’s economic performance was the specific short-term influence of the 
IMF in the stabilization program and reform process, as well as the long-term anchor role 
played by the EU. The EU anchor not only increased confidence in the overall stability of the 
economy and the amount of FDI and privatization, but also provided incentives for further 
reforms in line with membership prospects. However, the end of the stand-by agreement with 
the IMF and the unwillingness of both EU and Turkish policy-makers to come to an 
agreement due to the Cyprus issue, the dominance of right-wing Christian Democratic leaders 
suspicious of Turkish membership because of cultural concerns and immigration issues, and a 
weakening of the Justice and Development Party (JDP)’s commitment to the EU accession 
process in its second term—these have all led to the deterioration of relations between Turkey 
and the IMF and Turkey and the EU; in the long run, this makes the Turkish economy much 
more vulnerable to external shocks.  
  E: Political instability: Although this paper focuses on the economic dimension of the 
Turkish success in recent years, it is obvious that political stability is a critical condition for 
sustainable growth. One of the reasons for the recent successful performance of the Turkish 
economy was, of course, the majority government of the JDP. Poorly governed by successive 
coalition governments in the 1990s, Turkey was in need of political stability. In spite of initial 
doubts, the JDP showed considerable commitment to the implementation of the new stage of 
neo-liberal reforms.
54 The government relied on a stabilization program initiated under the 
auspices of the IMF and the political entrepreneurship of Kemal Derviş in the first term. 
During its first term in office, the JDP projected the image of a pragmatic and reformist party. 
                                                 
54 For a detailed discussion of the JDP in Turkish politics, see the edited volume by Yavuz (2006),  in particular 
his introductory chapter and the chapter on the political economy perspective by Öniş (2006).    37
However, its recent performance has increasingly raised questions about the true nature of its 
policies, and there has been a growing polarization of the political environment over the 
course of 2007 and 2008, with potentially damaging consequences for economic 
performance.
55 The degree of polarization in recent Turkish domestic politics has once more 
indicated that Turkey has not yet emerged as a fully consolidated democracy. The trial 
involving the closure of the JDP, a party which received almost half of the votes in the recent 
elections, constituted a major threat to economic and political stability.
56 Furthermore, recent 
allegations involving a planned military intervention on the part of retired generals and other 
high-ranking public figures, which has resulted in yet another major controversial court case, 
have clearly demonstrated that democracy is not yet the “only game in town.” There is no 
doubt that such uncertainties tend to undermine the trust of key economic actors and create a 
downward bias in terms of economic performance, which can be clearly detected from the 
recent behavior of key macroeconomic indicators. Rising interest rates and inflation, as well 
as the slowdown in FDI and overall growth, highlight the negative bias created by the recent 
wave of political uncertainties, although it is too early to predict the extent and the depth of 
the downward bias exerted by this unfavorable set of political developments. 
  F: The need for second-generation reforms: Most analysts of the Turkish economy 
have acknowledged the JDP government’s success in maintaining fiscal and monetary 
discipline and implementing important regulatory reforms, building on the process which had 
already started in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis. Nevertheless, it has been acknowledged 
that the same government has been less successful in terms of designing and implementing 
                                                 
55 On the JDP, moderate Islam, and secularist opposition in Turkey, see Somer (2007).  
56 Fortunately, the final decision of the Constitutional Court in July of 2008 did not involve the closure of the 
party. Instead, the governing party received a serious warning for violating the principles of the secular 
constitutional order. If indeed the party had been banned from politics, the outcome could have been a much 
higher degree of political and economic instability, especially if the decision had been associated with the 
suspension of negotiations with the EU altogether.   38
the next-generation reforms aimed at longer-term industrial restructuring. Arguably, an active 
industrial policy has been the missing link in the armory of the JDP’s policies.
57 
  All these factors indicate the interactive nature of challenges in terms of achieving 
sustainable growth for the Turkish economy and the vicious and virtuous cyclical nature of 
economic development. The more the Turkish economy is able to overcome these challenges, 
the less likely it will turn back to the vicious cycle and unstable macroeconomic environment 
of the 1990s, and the more likely it will converge with the developed economies of the world, 
just as EA countries managed in the past and, more recently, CEECs.  
  The threats and challenges to the sustainability of high growth rates highlighted so far 
should not lead us to disregard the significant opportunities for economic growth in the 
medium term. Turkey’s role as an energy transit country and its growing economic and 
political influence in the surrounding regions, particularly in the Black Sea region, assumes a 
major significance in this context. The revenues generated through pipelines as well as trade 
and investment linkages with the surrounding regions constitute an important avenue for 
future economic growth. The growing economic significance of Turkey as a pivotal country 
in its immediate neighborhood is increasingly related to its role as an energy transit country in 
the broader context of European energy security. In this context, as argued by Aliboni (2006), 
the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project initiated in 1992 is likely to become 
progressively more important as the EU itself increasingly becomes an “insider” in the Black 
Sea economic space. The direct involvement of the EU in the Black Sea region might enhance 
the role of Turkey, and this may in the medium term facilitate a revitalization of the EU 
anchor. 
  Another medium- and long-term opportunity for Turkey is its demographic dividend. 
Turkey has a relatively young population, which in the future is expected to increase labor 
                                                 
57 Indeed, this was the main theme of the TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) -Koç 
University Economic Research Forum Conference entitled “Turkey’s Search for Industrial Policy in the Light of 
International Experiences,” held on December 25, 2007 in Istanbul.    39
participation rate and domestic savings. Figure 15 indicates that the bulk of the population is 
less than 25 years old and likely to continue its education. In time, it is expected that this 
young segment of the population will become a part of the production/employment process, 
which will not only lead to economic growth, but also to an increase in domestic savings. A 
recent report prepared by Rijckeghem and Üçer (2008) estimates that the reduction in the 
youth dependency ratio is likely to increase domestic savings by about 5% of GDP.  
  Also, the growth of entrepreneurship, as well as its spread across the country beyond 
the confines of the Marmara region, constitutes important positive developments from the 
perspective of longer-term growth. The so-called Anatolian tigers, emerging as the winners of 
the neo-liberal restructuring in Turkey, have not only widened the geographical boundaries of 
investment, but also created new employment opportunities in Turkey’s peripheral regions 
(Öniş 2006). The emergence of this Anatolian bourgeoisie and the rise of Anatolian cities can 
be seen as an opportunity to overcome uneven regional development and unemployment in 
the periphery. Parallel to this development, big business in Turkey has been transformed over 
time from inward-oriented entities to outward-oriented firms whose operations are 
increasingly global in nature. Indeed, many of the major conglomerates have established 
themselves as exporters of capital, which points towards the growing maturity of Turkish 
industrial capital. The transnationalization of big business in Turkey represents a striking 
aspect of the recent globalization of the Turkish economy and an important source of longer-
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Extending the limits of analysis: The social dimension of the Turkish economy 
So far, our analysis of the recent performance of the Turkish economy in terms of inter-
temporal and cross-country comparisons has only dealt with the improvements and challenges 
concerning the strict economic measures of macroeconomic performance and growth. 
Nevertheless, a complete and balanced assessment of the recent performance of the Turkish 
economy necessitates incorporating the social dimension into the picture: unemployment, 
inequality and poverty. The experiences of EA economies have demonstrated that sustainable 
growth was accompanied by a relatively even distribution of income, creating employment for 
the masses and reducing poverty.  
  Achievements in terms of growth in the recent period have not been matched by an 
equally striking increase in employment. According to recent statistics, the overall 
unemployment ratio in Turkey is 11.4% and 11.6%, for 2007 and 2008, respectively.
58 The 
figures are much worse for non-agricultural unemployment and youth unemployment. While 
non-agricultural unemployment in 2007 was 14.2%, youth unemployment reached 21.7%, 
                                                 
58 The data are taken from the State Institute of Statistics.    41
which is likely to create disillusionment and associated social problems, such as a high crime 
rate and social unrest.  
  Turkey can be considered a moderately unequal society with respect to income 
distribution as measured by the Gini coefficient. Inequality in Turkish society does not reach 
the levels of LA countries, but is higher than in European countries and such EA cases as 
Japan and South Korea.
59 The latest available datum for the Gini coefficient is 0.42 (Figure 
19) for 2003. More interestingly, Figure 16 indicates that there has been a secular decline in 
income inequality in Turkish economic history since 1968. Even in the neo-liberal era, the 
Gini coefficient was generally falling, which makes the phenomenon quite paradoxical.
60 Yet, 
a better distribution of income and a democratic mechanism for interest intermediation may 









                                                 
59 See Figure 7.  
60 Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan (2000) only focus on the changes in the period between 1987 and 1994, in 
which the Gini coefficient rose by 5%. However, the secular decline needs an analysis that considers the post-
1968 period and explains the puzzle of how the Gini coefficient decreased in a neo-liberal structural 
transformation. A possible answer to this paradox is the transformation of the Turkish economy from a 
rural/agricultural to an urban and industrial/service-based economy, which reduced rural–urban inequality. A 
strong component of inequality stems from rural-urban differences; the more economy and society are urbanized, 
the less society will be unequal. Another explanation takes into consideration the fact that the expansion of the 
neo-liberal coalition over time created new ways to distribute resources. The JDP’s electoral coalition with its 
cross-class constituency, the rise of small and medium-sized enterprises and the practice of informal 
redistribution mechanisms might all have played a role in the reduction of the Gini coefficient.  
61 It is important to note that such democratic demands can easily turn into populist demands and avenues for 
rent-seeking, as frequently observed in Turkish politics and economic history. However, it is not democracy per 
se, but Turkey’s own democratic deficits which have created an environment in which patronage politics and 
populism have been associated with corruption and an inefficient allocation of resources. See Öniş and Şenses 
(2007).   42
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Poverty
62 is the third dimension of our analysis focusing on the societal aspects in the 
assessment of the recent performance of the Turkish economy. Extreme poverty is almost 
absent in the Turkish context.
63 However, the data provided by the CIA World Factbook and 
the UNDP statistics indicate that there are serious levels of moderate poverty and poverty 
adjusted to PPP.
64 In order to maintain steady growth rates in a politically stable environment, 
policy-makers in Turkey should also consider the social aspects of economic polices and pay 
greater attention to unemployment, inequality and poverty. 
 
 
                                                 
62 The meaning of poverty and its measurement is a controversial issue. The World Bank defines two measures: 
extreme poverty measured by the income of less than 1 US$ per day, and moderate poverty (less than 2 US$). 
Both of these are absolute measures of poverty and do not take price levels into account. That is why some 
scholars use price-adjusted (PPP) measures of poverty. In addition, some introduce the concept of relative 
poverty, measured as earning less than a half of the income earned by the median person in terms of distribution 
of income.  
63 Actually, these numbers are disputed. The data provided by the UNDP claim that 3% of extreme poverty 
remains, whereas the data by the State Institute of Statistics indicate that extreme poverty is non-existent in the 
Turkish case.  
64 UNDP: 27%; CIA World Factbook: 20%. See the UNDP Human Development Report 2007 and CIA World 
Factbook.    43
Concluding remarks 
The central objective of this paper has been to confront the question of whether the recent 
Turkish growth experience represents a sustainable process. We have compared the 
performance of the Turkish economy in the post-2001 era not only to its performance in the 
previous era of neo-liberal reforms, but we have also placed it in a broader global context. In 
this context, the benchmark is not confined to the experience of East Asian “tigers,” but also 
includes other emerging markets in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Comparisons with its 
own past have been helpful in terms of highlighting the achievements of the Turkish economy 
in recent years. Comparative analysis involving other emerging markets has clearly 
pinpointed the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the recent Turkish economic performance. 
Most importantly, the current account balance and dependence on foreign capital and global 
liquidity conditions can be considered the main challenges to the sustainability of long-term 
growth in Turkey. Furthermore, the decreasing influence of the EU anchor and its possible 
effects on FDI attraction and privatization revenues might further deteriorate the current 
account balance and macroeconomic stability. In addition to these factors, changes in the 
favorable global liquidity conditions due to the financial crisis in the US economy might 
affect the Turkish economy which is vulnerable to such external shocks. Last but not least, 
unlike between 2002 and 2006, the present government can hardly be described as 
enthusiastically committed to economic reforms and the EU accession process.  
  Can Turkey emerge as a new tiger, or will it remain a temporary star? So far, this 
analysis has portrayed a balanced account of the Turkish economy, emphasizing both the 
positive achievements in the recent period, as well as its weaknesses and major challenges to 
long-term stability and growth. Turkey can emerge as a new tiger if, and only if, it can 
manage to overcome the challenges and capitalize on medium- and long-term opportunities. 
In this respect, the externally dependent growth should be reduced with an increase in   44
domestic savings and exports—to exceed imports—leading to a decrease in the current 
account deficit and the vulnerability to external shocks and global imbalances. The EU 
accession process should continue to be the major objective of the government, creating 
incentives and conditionality for further reform and structural transformation with real 
membership prospects. The EU accession process does not only empower domestic actors to 
achieve economic reforms and increase investor confidence, but also provides certain 
incentives for further democratization in Turkey. Both as a normative ideal and a contributor 
to long-term development, democratization is likely to be an essential component of 
sustainable growth and political stability. In contrast to the EA experience and similar to CE 
countries, Turkey’s targets should aim beyond sustainable growth and incorporate measures 
of democracy and governance. Last but not least, Turkey can become a new tiger to the extent 
that it can manage to sustain growth by reducing inequality in society, creating employment, 
and eliminating poverty. In short, the recent growth rates, the reduction of inflation, FDI 
attraction, privatization revenues and the reform process have all contributed to the initial 
phase of tiger-like performance. Yet, this initial phase should be complemented by longer-
term development strategies designed to overcome the challenges to sustainable growth. 
Otherwise, Turkey may yet again experience one of its short-lived growth phases and remain 
a temporary star rather than an emerging tiger, due to the myopic bias of politicians and other 
economic actors.  
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